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1 Introduction
From its very beginning the demand for leadership has played an important role in global
climate politics. Already in 1992, in relation to the normative principle of “common but
differentiated responsibility”, it was postulated in Article 3 of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that “…, the developed country parties
should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.” Originally,
attributing a leading role to industrialized countries was mainly motivated by distributional
motives since these rich countries have a higher capacity to bear the burden of mitigation
measures and, at the same time, have been responsible for the major share of greenhouse
gas emissions in the past. But, in the spirit of the “bottom-up-approach”, the postulate for
leadership is also based on the expectation of a “motivational push” caused by the leaders:
By adopting a pioneering role and by setting a good example, these countries should induce
other countries to follow suit in the provision of the global public good “climate protection”.
In practice the leadership idea has become prominent in the EU, and especially in Germany,
since it serves as a justification for far-reaching activities in climate and energy policy, e.g., for
the 20:20:20 goal and for the subsidisation of renewable and also nuclear energy in European
countries.
According to the theory of public goods that has become an important tool for the theo-
retical analysis of global climate policy (e.g., Sandler 1997; Barrett 2005, pp. 1462–1465;
Cornes 2015), a positive effect from leadership is not the normal case. Rather, the standard
model of voluntary public good provision predicts that increased public good contributions
by the leaders have a negative effect on the public good contributions of the followers. Against
the background of this pessimistic view, the main objective of this paper is to show how, by
enriching the standardmodel of voluntary public good provisionwith elements of behavioural
economics, positive effects on the followers’ public good contributions may result so that
leadership becomes successful, which in theoretical terms means that the follower’s reaction
path is upward sloping and the contributions of both countries are strategic complements.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2, we provide a review of the existing theoretical
literature on the effects of leaders’ behaviour on followers going beyond the public good
model. In Sect. 3, we present and interpret various types of psychological preferences as
different kinds of inequality aversion, a desire for reciprocity and impure altruism in the
sense of warm-glow-of-giving. In Sect. 4, we then show how, in an otherwise standard static
two-country model of voluntary public good provision, the inclusion of such psychological
components into the follower’s preferences may entail a positively sloped reaction function
of the follower, thus making leadership successful. In Sect. 5, we consider a public goods
model with conjectural variations to show, how increased public good contributions by the
leader may influence the expectations of the follower so that he is motivated to increase his
public good contributions. In Sect. 6, these results are illustrated by an example. Finally,
in Sect. 7, we briefly discuss some implications for climate policy, which follow from our
theoretical analysis.
2 Leadership in Public Good Provision from the Perspective of Economic
Theory: A Short Review of the Literature
From the perspective of standard models which describe public good provision by indepen-
dent agents, the prospects for successful leadership appear rather poor: In a simple one-shot
game with a discrete strategy space, the cooperation problem is usually modelled as a pris-
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oners’ dilemma or a chicken game (e.g., Lipnowski and Maital 1983; Cornes and Sandler
1996, pp. 305–319; with application to international environmental problems Finus 2001,
pp. 21–41; DeCanio and Fremstad 2013). In both of these games, a unilateral cooperative
effort by a leader is met with non-cooperation by the follower. In the model of voluntary
public good provision with a continuous strategy space (Bergstrom et al. 1986; Cornes and
Sandler 1996), a self-interested Stackelberg leader will choose a smaller public good con-
tribution than that chosen in a simultaneous Nash game, everything else being equal. The
reason is that strategic behaviour enables the leader to free-ride even more on the contri-
butions of the follower so that the underprovision problem is aggravated (Varian 1994).
A negative outcome of the sequential game becomes even more likely if it is the agent with
the higher preferences for the public good who moves first (Nosenzo and Sefton 2011). In
this public-good scenario, the leader does not act as a pioneer for better climate protection,
but uses his first-mover advantage in an environmentally detrimental way.
If, instead, an altruistically motivated country unilaterally increases its public good contri-
butions, the standard model of private public good provision predicts that the other countries
will react not by increasing, but by reducing their abatement efforts (e.g., Cornes and Sandler
1996; Buchholz et al. 1998)—which, as a special type of the carbon leakage phenomenon,
has been vividly described by Sinn (2012, p. 143) as “grabbing from the collection box”. In
theoretical terms, such an offsetting behaviour of the outsiders means that reaction curves are
negatively sloped and the agents’ public good contributions are strategic substitutes. Thus,
a crowding-out effect arises and part of the leader countries’ increased mitigation efforts
evaporates. The crowding-out effect may be reinforced when climate change damages are
uncertain and the followers are sufficiently risk-averse (Auerswald et al. 2011). In a similar
way, a crowding-out effect results in the non-cooperative scenario when a country takes uni-
lateral measures to develop and improve “green” technologies as, e.g., through subsidization
of renewable energy (Buchholz and Konrad 1994; Ihori 1996).
But also if the public good is provided cooperatively, total public good supplymay fall after
a country’s unilateral increase of its public good contribution (or a unilateral R&D-measure),
since a unilateral action changes the threat point of a Nash bargaining game. Unless the
level of public good supply is the same for all Pareto optimal solutions, public good supply
in the bargaining outcome may decrease through the shift of the threat point, which is the
famous paradox of Hoel (1991)1. For unilateral R&D-activities a similar result was obtained
by Buchholz and Konrad (1994). Intuitively speaking, a pioneering country may lose the
power to push through its ambitious environmental goals when it acts unilaterally before
negotiations start. In case of uncertain abatement costs, it also becomes less likely that an
efficient bargaining outcome is attained if one country has unilaterally committed to higher
mitigation efforts (Konrad and Thum 2014).
Furthermore, according to Sinn’s “green paradox” (e.g., Sinn 2012),2 producers of fossil
fuels may counteract the leading countries’ attempts to curb CO2 emissions by shifting
supply from the future to the present by lowering current fuel prices, which represents an
intertemporal leakage effect. Interregional leakage effects, caused by a fall of the world
1 Conditions on preferences, which ensure constant public good supply along the utility possibility frontier,
are described by Bergstrom and Cornes (1981). See also Cornes and Sandler (1996, pp. 199–201). If these
conditions are satisfied, the Hoel paradox is excluded.
2 The occurrence of this effect hinges on several conditions: e.g., the exact design of climate policy or the
ability of producers to increase the supply of fossil fuels. Moreover, a crucial, but contestable, assumption
underlying the “green paradox” is that all resources in the ground will finally be dug out and exhausted. For
an encompassing review of the “green paradox” and its various versions, see the collection of essays in Pittel
et al. (2014).
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market prices of fossil fuels or by a shift of carbon-intensive industries to countries with a less
ambitious climate policy, can also neutralize abatement activities. The cost of leadership may
be magnified through structural changes in the economy, de-industrialization, depreciation
of capital and job losses, so that pioneering countries may further lose bargaining power.
The danger of ineffective or even detrimental pioneering activities is particularly great if
the leading coalition is small since then the crowding-out effect caused by the outsiders is
strong (Buchholz et al. 1998) or, in case of supply-side reactions according to the “green
paradox”, a larger group of outsiders can more easily absorb the additional supply of fossil
fuels.
Theoretical economics, however, also provides some reasons for a more positive assess-
ment of leadership in public good provision in general and climate protection in particular (see
also, e.g., section 4.2 in Edenhofer et al. 2015). So, a one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game may
turn into a stag hunt or an assurance game (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 2009) if certain fairness
preferences prevail in the follower country (Pittel and Rübbelke 2012) that either reflect a
positive valuation of reciprocal behaviour (Rabin 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004)
or a preference for a more equal distribution of the game’s payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). In the context of climate change, an assurance game may result
from specific abatement technologies, risk preferences or perceptions of the climate problem,
e.g., if the follower country is sufficiently risk averse and believes that it can prevent a climate
catastrophe by “topping” the efforts of the leader (e.g., Endres and Ohl 2001; Buchholz et al.
2014). In a repeated prisoners‘ dilemma game, a large initial public good contribution by
some country may initiate continual cooperation, which is, e.g., implemented by a tit-for-tat
strategy (Axelrod 1984; specifically in the context of climate change see Barrett 2005, pp.
1489–1493). In an evolutionary game setting, positive reactions by the follower can also be
triggered through learning effects (e.g., De Oliveira et al. 2005).
In a world of uncertainty, pioneering efforts of leading agents may reveal the costs and
benefits of a public good to other agents, which reduces their uncertainty about the effects
of their own efforts and thus increases their willingness to contribute to the public good
(Hermalin 1998; with application to climate change Brandt 2004). Irreversible public good
contributions by the leader may also relieve the follower of the fear that he is cheated by
the leader and thus helps to make subsequent communication easier and leadership more
successful (Barbieri 2012).
3 Different Types of Psychological Preferences
While in the standard public good model (with a summation technology for public good
provision andnormality of the public good in the follower’s preferences) crowding-out results,
some changes of this model may entail strategic complementarity and thus lead to crowding-
in. Then, to vary Sinn’s metaphor, the follower’s behaviour is characterized not by “grabbing
from” but by “putting additional money into the collection box”. It is well-known from the
literature that a positive reaction by the follower can be generated if there is a non-summation
technology for public good production (see ArceM 2001; Kempf and Rota Graziosi 2010), if
contributions to the public good entail private “ancillary” benefits for the follower (e.g. Pittel
and Rübbelke 2008), which is described by the “impure” public good model (Cornes and
Sandler 1984a, 1994, 1996), or if the private good is inferior. We now extend the preference-
related approach for explaining successful leadership by incorporating certain psychological
motivations from behavioural economics into the follower’s utility function.
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Let country L be the leader (with income wL and private consumption xL ) and country F
be the follower (with income wF and private consumption xF ) in a static game of voluntary
public good provision. The public good contribution of country L is gL and that of country
F is gF . As in the standard model, we suppose a summation technology for public good
production, i.e., total public good supply is given by G = gL + gF , country L’s private
consumption is xL = wL − gL and that of country F is xF = wF − gF . The preferences
of country L are assumed to be only self-regarding by the utility function u(xL , G), which
is twice differentiable with positive first derivatives, quasi-concave, and both the private and
the public good are strictly normal.
What really matters for our analysis are the preferences V (xF , G, gF , gL) of the follower
country F , in which the first two arguments xF and G represent the standard utility compo-
nents, while the additional behavioural or “psychological” preferences are captured by the
third and fourth argument referring to country F’s own public good contribution gF and that
of country L , i.e., gL . This extended utility function V is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable in all four variables with V1, V2, V3 and V4 as its first-order partial derivatives
and Vi j (with i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4) as its second-order partial derivatives for which our differ-
entiability assumption gives symmetry, i.e., Vi j = Vji . As in the standard model without
psychological preferences, V1 > 0 and V2 > 0 clearly hold. For the second-order partial
derivatives, we may assume that, as usual, V11 < 0 and V22 < 0. But also for the partial
derivatives V3 and V4 of the psychological parts, a non-negative sign usually seems to be the
most plausible assumption.
On the one hand,V3 ≥ 0 indicates that its ownpublic good contribution provides additional
psychological benefit for country F , whichmight be interpreted as some “warm-glow giving”
in the sense of Andreoni (1990). It is plausible to assume decreasing marginal benefits also
here, i.e., V33 ≤ 0. On the other hand, V4 ≥ 0 can be interpreted as capturing that the
people in country F experience some moral satisfaction if country L increases its public
good contribution and, thus, is “doing its part” in financing the common project. A negative
V4, in contrast, then would mean that country F has envious or shameful feelings against
larger public good contribution of country L , or would simply dislike “overachieving” by an
overzealous leader. Such attitudes, however, are in contradiction with country F’s material
interests. The sign of the second partial derivative V44 is not straightforward to motivate, but
it does not play any role for the results of this paper.
If V3 = 0 (or V4 = 0), we can abbreviate the utility function V as V (xF , G, gL) (or
V (xF , G, gF )). If V3 = V4 = 0 we are back in the standard model without psychological
utility components, while the case with V3 > 0 and V4 = 0 formally corresponds to Cornes
and Sandler’s (1994, 1996) impure public good model.
Various behavioural approaches suggest a more specific form for the utility function
V (xF , G, gF , gL). So it is often supposed that the psychological utility componentψ(gF , gL)
enters the utility function V in an additively separable way, which gives
V (xF , G, gF , gL) = v (xF , G) + ψ (gF , gL) . (1)
If the extended preferences are of type (1), there is a clear distinction between material
(or “egoistic” preferences) as described by v(xF , G) and the psychological preferences as
described by ψ(gF , gL), and V13 = V14 = V23 = V24 = 0 holds for the second order cross
partial derivatives. Given (1) we have V1 = v1, V2 = v2, V3 = ψ1 and V4 = ψ2. Of special
importance is the sub-case where
ψ (gF , gL) = ψm (gF − gL) . (2)
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Then clearly V3 = −V4 = ψ ′m holds. Two interpretations for (2) can be provided, both
of which are related to specific fairness concepts: On the one hand, a utility function of
type (1) may express inequality aversion of country F with respect to (w.r.t.) public good
contributions. Then ψ ′m has no uniform sign: If gF > gL , an increase of gF (or a decrease
of gL ) increases inequality of public good contributions and thus reduces country F’s utility
so that ψ ′m < 0 holds. If, however, gF < gL , then ψ ′m > 0.
Similarly, but conceptually a little different, a utility function as described by (2) may
indicate that country F has some intrinsic preference for reciprocity in the spirit of Rabin
(1993).3 With such a reciprocal attitude, country F has a bad conscience and thus experiences
a utility loss if its own public good contribution falls below that of country L because it feels
morally obliged to reciprocate country L’s “kindness” as expressed through this country’s
public good contribution. If, however, its ownpublic good contribution exceeds that of country
L , then country F feels unfairly exploited by country L , which arouses a sentiment of anger in
country F .With this interpretation, we again get V3 = ψ ′m < 0 if gF > gL and V3 = ψ ′m > 0
if gF < gL . The feelings of bad conscience and anger, however, may have different welfare
weights.
In a similar vein, but based on a precise interpretation of Rabin’s (1993) approach, Nyborg
(2014) has introduced a reciprocity component into the utility function, which essentially
depends on benchmark values gˆL and gˆF for the public good contributions of country L and
country F , respectively, and which leads to a psychological utility term of the form
ψ (gF , gL) = ψn
((
gF − gˆF
) · (gL − gˆL
))
(3)
with ψ ′n > 0.4 Given the reciprocity term ψn((gF − gˆF ) · (gL − gˆL)), a further increase of
country F’s public good contribution will increase country F’s utility when both countries
initially make contributions above their benchmarks, which can be interpreted as the fulfil-
ment of someminimal obligations. But if country L is underachieving and violating its duties,
then country F could reduce its anger about country L’s unkind behaviour by reducing its
own public good contribution. We later deal with Nyborg’s utility function in more detail by
discussing a specific example.
Country F’s extended utility function V also reflects the case in which country L’s utility
directly affects utility of country F . Again assuming an additively separable form such ‘other-
regarding preferences’ yield
V (xF , G, gF , gL) = v (xF , G) + αu (wL − gL , G) . (4)
A positive value of the parameter α reflects altruistic preferences of country F , which means
that country F shows a positive interest in thewell-being of country L . Given a utility function
of type (4), we have V1 = v1, V2 = v2 + αu2, V3 = 0, and V4 = −αu1.
There is also the possibility that (4) expresses inequality aversion of country F w.r.t.
levels of material utility. Then α is positive or negative depending on the relation between
the utility levels of leader L and follower F .5 A positive (negative) α is obtained if in
the initial allocation, country L’s utility is smaller (larger) than that of country F . Then a
3 For an encompassing discussion of the concept of preference-related “intrinsic“ (in contrast to “instrumen-
tal“) reciprocity, see Sobel (2005).
4 Note that in the model of Nyborg (2014) the agents only face a dichotomous choice about contributing or
not contributing to the public good.
5 For special self-regarding utility functions, Kolstad (2012) explores the effects that such other-regarding
preferences have on the Nash equilibrium of voluntary public good provision and on coalition formation in
this context.
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increase (decrease) of country L’s self-regarding utility reduces inequality of these utility
levels and leads to a rise of country F’s extendedutility (for different versions of psychological
preferences with a concern for equality of outcomes see Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002; and the generalization by Benjamin 2015).6
4 Successful Leadership due to Follower’s Psychological Preferences
Given a general extended utility function V (xF , G, gF , gL), we now want to determine in a
unified way the conditions for successful leadership, i.e., for a positive slope of country F ‘s
reaction function grF (gL), defined by g
r
F (gL) = argmaxgF V (wF − gF , gF + gL , gF , gL).7
The first-order condition of this maximization problem is
−V1
(








wF − grF (gL) , grF (gL) + gL , grF (gL) , gL
) = 0. (5)
Omitting arguments and observing symmetry of second partial derivatives, we find that the
second-order condition for maximization of V becomes D := V11 + V22 + V33 − 2(V12 +
V13 − V23) < 0, which is assumed to hold. Clearly, Vii < 0 for i = 1, 2, 3 is favourable for
the fulfilment of this condition.
Similar to Arce M and Sandler (2005, p. 17), implicit differentiation of (5) yields
∂grF
∂gL
= V22 − V12 + V32 − V41 + V42 + V43−D (6)
as the slope of country F’s reaction path. From the second-order condition D < 0, it follows
that the denominator of (6) is positive so that the sign of
∂grF
∂gL
only depends on the sign of the




V32 + V42 + V43 − V41 > V12 − V22. (7)
If condition (7) is satisfied in the initial allocation, starting fromwhich country L unilaterally
increases its public good contribution, then country F shows a positive reaction and leadership
becomes successful. This outcome ismore likely if the left-hand side of inequality (7) is large,
i.e., if
• country F’s psychologically motivated marginal valuations of its own and country L’s
contributions are much increased when public good supply increases (i.e., if V32 + V42
is large).
• an increase of country L’s public good positively affects the marginal psychological
valuation of country F’s own contribution, i.e., if V34 = V43 is positive and large.
• an increase in country F’s private consumption has a negative (or a positive but small)
impact on country F’s marginal valuation of country L’s contribution, i.e., if V41 is small.
6 To make this explicit, assume that the difference between the utility of the other country and its own utility
directly affects extended utility of country F , i.e., V˜ = v + β(u − v). Inequality aversion of country F then
is reflected by having β < 0 if u > v and β > 0 if u < v (and, e.g., β = 0 if u = v). If β < 1, the extended
preferences of country F can, after a linear transformation, be represented by V = v + αu where α = β1−β .
7 For an early discussion of successful leadership in the impure public good model, see Sandler (1996, esp.
pp. 268–269).
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In the case of additive separability according to (1), the interpretation of condition (6) becomes
easier since V32 = V42 = V41 = 0 holds and (7) is reduced to
ψ12 = ψ21 = V43 > V12 − V22 = v12 − v22. (8)
When leadership starts from the standard Nash equilibrium of voluntary public good provi-
sion, we have v12 − v22 > 0.8 Then condition (8) clearly shows the importance of strong
reciprocal preferences for successful leadership: If ψ12 = ψ21 is positive and large, country
F is much more (less) willing to spend more on the public good when the other country
spends more (less) on it.
Further specializing the utility function to type (2), condition (8) becomes
− ψ ′′m > v12 − v22, (9)
whichmeans that the negativemarginal valuation of unequal public good contributions grows
with the degree of inequality.
In the case of other-regarding preferences as described by (4), we get V12 = v12, V22 =
v22 + αu22, V32 = V41 = V43 = 0, and V42 = −αu12 so that the crowding-in condition (7)
turns into −αu12 > v12 − (v22 + αu22), which implies
α (u22 − u12) > v12 − v22. (10)
When, in addition, u22 − u12 < 0 holds (see also fn. 8 above), condition (10) is always
satisfied if, in the initial allocation, the leader’s material utility exceeds that of the follower
and the follower’s inequality aversion is sufficiently strong, i.e., α has a large negative value.
If, however, α is positive, which occurs either when country F’s material utility in the initial
allocation exceeds that of country L or if country F is altruistic, condition (10) is not satisfied
and crowding-out unavoidably results.
Finally, in the case of pure warm-glow-of-giving where clearly V41 = V42 = V43 = 0
holds, crowding-in results from condition (7) if
V32 > V12 − V22. (11)
This condition is satisfied if thewarm-glow-of-giving effect increases sufficientlywhenpublic
good supply increases. This effect can either be attributed to a pleasure from conforming with
others’ actions or by some reasoning such as: The greater is the aggregate contribution to the
common good, the more I consider my own contribution as meaningful.
Apart from that, there is another possibility to explain the follower’s positive reaction to
an increased public good contribution of the leader in the case of warm-glow-of-giving. To
this end we construct—for some given utility function V with V4 = 0—a utility function
for which the warm-glow-of-giving component no longer appears explicitly and which only
depends on xF and G. So, for all xF ∈ [0, wF ] and all G ≥ 0, we define
v˜ (xF , G) = V (xF , G, wF − xF ) . (12)
For this ancillary utility function, v˜ (which is of the same form as usually applied in public
good theory), we suppose that it has the standard properties, i.e., that utility is increasing in
both arguments, which specifically means that v˜1 = V1 − V3 > 0, and that utility is quasi-
concave. Furthermore, when the public good is non-inferior, the income expansion path,
along which the marginal rate of substitution is equal to the marginal rate of transformation
8 Given v1v2 = 1 it follows that v12 − v22 =
v1
v2
v12 − v22 > 0, where the second inequality follows from the
normality assumption.
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(= 1 as assumed), can be represented as a function of public good supply, i.e., as xeF (G, 1).
A short calculation shows that taking the derivative of xeF (G, 1) w.r.t. G gives an expression,
which has the same numerator as in (6) and whose denominator is positive. This implies
that crowding-in (crowding-out) is entailed if
∂xeF
∂G < 0 (>0) holds, i.e., if the private good is
inferior (normal) for country F , given the ancillary utility function v˜.9 This transformation
of the impure public good scenario into a scenario with pure public goods gives a further
explanation for the existence and uniqueness results obtained by Kotchen (2007) for impure
public goods.
Note that in the warm-glow-of-giving scenario—unlike in the case of fairness preferences
considered above—a positively sloped reaction function of country F can never occur when
the psychological component additively enters the utility function V as in (1). Rather, it is
only the cross derivative V32 thatmay cause crowding-in in this case and thusmake leadership
successful.
To illustrate some of the general results derived in this section, we consider several exam-
ples that build on country F’s self-regarding utility function v(xF , G) = ln xF + β lnG,
where v12 = 0 and v22 = − βG2 . In the first two examples, the psychological component
enters country F’s extended preferences in an additive way as described by (1). Inequality
aversion w.r.t. public good contributions according to (2) is reflected by
ψm (gF − gL) = −α
2
(gF − gL)2 . (13)





where G is public good supply in the original allocation for which the leader’s unilateral
increase of his public good contributions starts.




) · (gL − gˆL





Again, we have V34 = α so that it follows from (8) that country F’s reaction path is positively
sloped also if condition (14) is satisfied. According to this scenario, favourable conditions for
successful leadership therefore are a large weight α of the psychological preference compo-
nent, low preferences for the public good in the follower’s material utility function and a large
public good supply G in the initial allocation. If this allocation is the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium, condition (15) in particular implies that the chances for successful leadership
are better when countries are rich since, everything else being constant, public good supply
in the Nash equilibrium is increasing with the countries’ income.
Concerning the case of other-regarding preferences with inequality aversion w.r.t. self-
regarding utility levels, we assume that, analogous to country F , country L’s utility function
is u(xL , G) = ln xL +γ lnG, so that u12 = 0 and u22 = − γG2 . Condition (10) then becomes
− αγ > β. (16)
Therefore, in case of inequality aversion w.r.t. material utility levels and α < 0, the prospects
for successful leadership again are better when the follower has strong psychological pref-
erences, but weak preferences for the public good. Furthermore, (16) shows that leadership
is more likely to be successful when the leader has strong preferences for the public good.
9 The relationship between impure public goods and inferiority of the private good has briefly been addressed
by Cornes and Sandler (1985, pp. 128–129).
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Finally, in the case of warm-glow-of-giving, we assume that country F’s extended utility
function is
V (xF , G, gF ) = v (xF , G) + αgFG, (17)
which—by applying (11)—leads to the same condition for successful leadership as given by
(14).
Activation of the follower’s psychological preferences through a unilateral increase of
the leader’s public good contribution may also initiate political negotiations between the
countries. An analysis of the dynamics of this negotiation process, however, lies outside the
scope of the paper.
5 Successful Leadership due to an Induced Change of the Follower’s
Expectations
Crowding-in, and thus successful leadership, may also arise when larger public good con-
tributions by the leader induce positive conjectures on the part of the follower about the
leader’s further reaction to marginal variations of the follower’s public good contributions.
By adapting an approach known from oligopoly theory, we can capture these beliefs for a
static public good model with “conjectural variations”, which indicate the marginal change b
of the other agent’s public good contribution that an agent expects if he marginally increases
or decreases his own contribution.
Such belief parameters b may be positive or negative, depending on whether a parallel or
a contrary reaction is expected. If b = 0, the follower does not suppose any influence of his
own contribution on that of the leader, so that we are back to Nash behaviour. A special case
for positive conjectural variations, which clearly reflects the idea of reciprocal behaviour,
corresponds to “Kantian” behaviour, for which an agent chooses his optimal actions under
the expectation that the other agents behave in a like manner, i.e., increase their public good
contributions by the same relative or absolute amount (Roemer 2010, 2015).10 Especially in
relation to a leader-follower scenario, it has been shown in the conjectural variation scenario
that public good supply at the Stackelberg equilibrium is even larger than in the standardNash
equilibrium if the follower has positive conjectural variations (Cornes and Sandler 1984b,
1996).
In the otherwise standard public good model with conjectural variations, crowding-out
by the follower is never avoided when the follower’s belief parameters b are exogenously
given and fixed (which, as a by-product of our analysis, will be shown later on). This not so
promising picture, however, changes when we allow for a specific endogenous determination
of conjectural variations so that the leader is able to generate positive beliefs through larger
public good contributions.
By modifying Cornes and Sandler’s (1984b) approach, we make endogenous belief for-
mation precise by assuming that the follower country F has a conjectural variation function
b(gL , gF ), which is assumed to be partially differentiable in both variables with partial deriv-
atives b1(gL , gF ) and b2(gL , gF ). Given the public good contributions gL and gF , country F
thus expects that country L will change its public good contribution by b(gL , gF ) marginal
units when country F increases its own public good contribution by one unit.
Concerning the sign of b1 and b2, we clearly may assume that b1 > 0; i.e., a leader’s
public good contribution is perceived as an expression of goodwill (or “kindness” in the
10 Some insightful hints at the relationship between Kantian behaviour and positive conjectural variations
have already been given by Cornes and Sandler (1984b, p. 377) and Itaya and Okamura (2003, p. 56).
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sense of Rabin 1993) and makes the follower believe that the leader is more willing to
respond positively to an increase of the follower’s contributions. In a certain sense, larger
public good contributions by country L have a trust-building effect for country F .
The assumption b1 > 0 captures recent insights in behavioural economics about the
important role of beliefs and the formation of other agents’ beliefs through own public good
contributions (e.g., Croson 2007; Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). As put by Gächter and
Renner (2014, p. 3): “Existing experimental evidence … suggests that people contribute
on average more the more they believe others contribute. This observation implies that any
factor that shifts beliefswill shift behaviour.” Remarkably, long before the start of behavioural
economics, Buchanan (1967), in an early contribution on voluntary public good provision
in an economy with two agents called Tizio and Caio, already envisaged the possibility that
“(b)y increasing … his own contribution, Tizio may hope that Caio will, …, follow suit and
cooperate in response” (p. 113), thus deviating from the standard rationality assumption.11
The sign of b2, however, is not determined a priori, but crucially depends on the reasoning
upon which country F forms its beliefs: On the one hand, country F may expect that any
increase of its own public good contribution will stimulate a greater positive reaction of
country L . If country F believes in such a positive motivational effect, then we have b2 > 0.
On the other hand, country F may perceive the goodwill signal set by some gL in relation to
its own public good contribution gF . Then, if gF becomes larger, the positive signal flowing
from a certain gL becomes weaker, so that it reduces the follower’s expectations and b2 < 0
holds. Finally, if country F makes his conjectures about future reactions of country L only
dependent upon country L’s previous actions, b2 = 0 is implied.
For a theoretical analysis of the effects that such endogenous belief have on the follower’s
behaviour, let—for any xF > 0 and G > 0—m(xF , G) = v1(xF ,G)v2(xF ,G) denote country F’s
marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good at (xF , G). If we
assume normality of both the private and the public good, we clearly have m1 < 0 and
m2 > 0 for the partial derivatives of m. An argument in the spirit of the Aggregative Game
Approach (Cornes and Hartley 2007; Acemoglu and Jensen 2013; in relation to conjectural
variations Possajennikov 2015) then implies that, given conjectural variations b(gL , gF ),
country F can only be in an equilibrium position12 when country L makes the public good
contribution gL , provided its own public good contribution gF satisfies
1 + b (gL , gF ) = m (wF − gF , gF + gL) . (18)
If, however, the marginal rates of substitution and the perceived marginal rates of transfor-
mation were different, then country F—by anticipating a reaction of county L according to
the conjectural variations given by b(gL , gF )—would expect to attain a greater utility level
by some change of its public good contribution. With b = 0, the standard model of voluntary
public good model would be obtained from (18) as a special case.13
11 Another brief hint at the potential relevance of beliefs for reciprocal (“matching“) behaviour already appears
in Guttman (1978, pp. 254–255), where even some reference to early public good experiments is made.
12 As always, such a static equilibrium may be considered as a reduced (and more easily tractable) form
of a complex dynamic game (Cabral 1995; Itaya and Okamura 2003, pp. 52–53). Scafuri (1992) and Itaya
and Okamura (2003) show how, either through learning or through the application of punishment strategies,
conjectural variations may emerge in a repeated game.
13 For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the conjectural variationsmodel and the standard public
good model, see Dasgupta and Itaya (1992). For a special focus on Warr neutrality, i.e., on the invariance of
the equilibrium w.r.t. an income redistribution, see Sandler and Posnett (1991) and Buchholz (1993).
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Taking the total derivative of (18) and again omitting all arguments yields the slope of the
follower’s reaction function as
∂grF
∂gL
= b1 − m2
m2 − m1 − b2 . (19)





which confirms the crowding-out effect, known from the standard public good model. But
taking the behavioural effects into account, we see that (19) implies that country F may
respond positively to an increased public good contribution of country L . This outcome, in
which leadership of country L is successful, occurs if and only if the numerator and the
denominator of (19) have the same sign. Concerning the conditions for
∂grF
∂gL
> 0, two cases
are distinguished:
(i) b1 > m2 and b2 < m2 − m1. In this case, the trust-building signalling effect provided
by country L’s public good contribution is strong, while country F’s belief in the moti-
vational effect triggered by its own public good contribution is relatively weak when it
is non-negative. The denominator of (19) is also positive if country F evaluates country
L’s kindness in relative terms so that b2 < 0 < m2 − m1.
(ii) b1 < m2 and b2 > m2 − m1. In this case, the signalling effect caused by the leader is
weak, while country F’s belief in the motivational effect caused by its increased public
good contribution is strong.
A negative reaction by country F obviously results if both behavioural effects, as described
by b1 and b2, are weak. But, far more surprisingly, crowding-out is also observed if both
behavioural effects, the signalling effect and the belief in the motivational effect are strong.
Note that the approach with endogenous belief formation outlined here is not subject to
the usual objection against the use of the conjectural variation concept, which is based on the
assumption of strict rational behaviour (Sugden 1985; Finus 2001, pp. 151–152; Figuières
et al. 2004). Rather, in ourmodel, we deliberately take determinants of behaviour into account
that go beyond the standard rationality assumption.14
6 An Example
Inspired by the representation of conjectural variations in Cornes and Sandler (1984b, 1996),
we provide a specific example where the perceived kindness of country L’s public good
contribution is also affected by country F’s contribution, i.e. b2 < 0 holds. In particular,
the expectations of country F positively depend on country L’s share of total contributions.




















+ m2 − m1 , (21)
14 Another objection (e.g., Sugden 1985) against the conjectural variations approach also does not hold when
the conjectures are endogenized in the way as suggested in this paper, since it is possible that equilibria with
positive conjectures and even Pareto optimal solutions satisfy the consistency requirement (Buchholz 2015).
An early contribution on necessary and sufficient conditions for consistent conjectural equilibria in a public
goods economy is Scafuri (1988).
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which is positive if and only if b′ gF
G2
> m2. If, given a positive reaction by the follower,
gF ≤ gL holds in the initial allocation, the denominator of (21) exceeds the numerator and
∂grF
∂gL
< 1 follows. Then the induced increase of the follower’s public good contribution is
smaller than the leader’s additional contribution.
For a further interpretation of (22), we abbreviate notation by setting σ = gLgF and
b˜(σ ) := b( σ
σ+1 ) = b( gLgL+gF ). Furthermore, let ε1+b˜,σ = b˜
′σ
1+b˜ and εm,gL =
m2gL
m denote the
elasticities of country F’s beliefs and its marginal rate of substitution, respectively, w.r.t. an
increase in country L’s public good contribution. Then, observing m = 1 + b = 1 + b˜, it
follows from (21) that
∂grF
∂gL
> 0 ⇔ ε1+b˜,σ > εm,gL . (22)
Condition (22) says that crowding-in results if an increase of gL improves the follower’s
beliefs about the leader’s behaviour more than it reduces its willingness to pay for the public
good.
For a special belief function as given by (20), we now consider the effect of a unilateral
increase of country L’s public good contribution starting from an interior Nash equilibrium
N , where the public good contributions of both countries are gNL and g
N
F , respectively.





= 0 for the conjectural variation function. Since in
the Nash equilibrium zero conjectures prevail, the Nash equilibrium is also the equilibrium
outcome, given these specific conjectural variations. We now assume that condition (22) is
satisfied at N so that a marginal increase of country L’s public good contribution triggers
a positive reaction by the follower. Then a marginal increase of country L’s public good
contribution clearly leads to an increase in aggregate public good supply, which is larger
than country L’s additional contribution so that country L moves into a position above its
indifference curve passing through (xNL , G
N ). The same holds true for country F , which
establishes that a Pareto improvement is attained through the unilateral action of country L .
We illustrate this result by assuming that both countries have the same utility function,
v(xi , G) = xiG, and the same income level, wi = 1 (i = L , F). Then m(xi , G) = Gxi ,
m1(xi , G) = − Gx2i and m2(xi , G) =
1
xi
. Further, similar to Cornes and Sandler (1984b,











If θ > 0, the follower has positive conjectures, and if θ < 0, he has negative conjectures
about the leader’s behaviour, independent of the size of the leader’s public good contribution.
Given (23), condition (18) becomes
gL + gF






According to (21), the slope of the reaction function, evaluated at the standard Nash equilib-
rium with gNL = gNF = 13 and xNL = xNF = GN = 23 , is
∂grF
∂gL
= θ − 2
θ + 4 , (25)
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since b′(1) = θ , m1 = − 32 and m2 = 32 . This implies strategic complements and thus
crowding-in results if θ > 2. Moreover, the larger θ , the stronger are the follower’s positive
reactions to the leader’s increased public good contributions.
7 Implications for Climate Policy
This paper has shown that, by enriching the standard public good model with elements
of behavioural economics, the otherwise occurring crowding-out effect is avoided so that
unilateral increases of abatement efforts by some leading countries no longer are ineffective
and meaningless. In this context, our analysis has emphasized the crucial role of other-
regarding preferences, the formation of reciprocal beliefs and the building of trust, which are
major features in behavioural economics. Both extensions of the public good model seem to
be of great relevance for climate policy.15
On the one hand, ethical arguments lie at the heart of the whole debate on climate change
and provide themotivation formore ambitious abatementmeasures. In particular, individuals,
firms and countries want to have some fair burden sharing w.r.t. greenhouse gas abatement
efforts, i.e., w.r.t. contributions to the global public good “climate protection”. Moreover,
these agents benefit from having a good conscience by acting responsibly towards the natural
environment and future generations. These non-standard preference components, which are
reflected in the type of utility function used in Sects. 3 and 4, may provide the basis for
successful leadership and an improved global climate policy if those psychological prefer-
ences are sufficiently strong. But, interestingly, this positive outcome will not come about
for all types of other-regarding preferences: If the follower is altruistic taking an interest in
the leader’s material well-being, leadership can never be successful, which might contradict
intuition. At a general level, our considerations on the effects of psychological preferences
also emphasize the eminent role “moral suasion” and thus the deliberate attempt at changing
preferences could play for effective climate protection.
On the other hand, leading activities in climate policy shown in the past by the EU and
especially by Germany, are accompanied by attempts to prove oneself as a reliable and
trustworthy partner, being prepared to continue one’s efforts for climate protection also in
the future. This endeavour can explain the strong attempts of the German government to fulfil
its obligations (which imply a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by 40% from 1990 till
2020)—even though the effect on global temperature is negligible. From this perspective,
the European Emission Trading System (EU ETS) can also be considered as a commitment
device to signal credibility of the EU’s firm involvement in climate change issues (Buchholz
and Peters 2005). It is the intention of this facet of leadership behaviour to foster positive
expectations of potential followers and to create a general atmosphere of trust in the global
community, which in general seems to be an essential pre-condition for effective cooperation
among independent agents. How such belief formation may make leadership successful in a
public good model has been demonstrated in Sects. 5 and 6.
Beyond these insights that are closely related to behavioural economics, there exist a lot
of other factors by which leadership in global climate policy will be made more successful—
and which are also well-known, not only from economic theory, but also from diplomacy
in general and experiences in climate diplomacy in particular (e.g., Benedick 1999). So,
15 The analysis in this paper has been purposefully restricted to the determination of conditions under which
the follower will respond positively to increased public good contributions by the leader. To examine the
equilibria of games of voluntary public good provision when agents have different types of psychological
preferences would be an important topic in the same context which, however, is left to future research.
123
Successful Leadership in Global Public Good Provision...
clearly, the danger of crowding-out is reduced when the leadership is provided by a large
and powerful coalition, which could use issue-linkage (e.g., in the context of trade policy)
to induce greenhouse gas mitigation by outsiders or even make credible threats to exclude
them from international cooperation (e.g., Nordhaus 2015). The leading country can also
use other (and more clever) instruments for its pioneering activities rather than raising direct
public good contributions: It can apply amatchingmechanism (e.g., Guttman 1978; Falkinger
et al. 1996) to subsidize the public good contributions of other countries. It thus may avoid
crowding-out behaviour by the followers and even attain Pareto optimal public good supply
through unilateral action (Buchholz et al. 2015a). Moreover, pioneering activities may be
conducted through e.g. “green” technological innovations and their transfer to other countries
(e.g., Golombek and Hoel 2005; El-Sayed and Rubio 2014; Buchholz et al. 2015b), which
may even havemore environmental impact at lower cost than unilateral increases of abatement
efforts. Such alternative approaches to successful leadership in global climate policy, however,
lie outside the theoretical framework used in this paper.
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